In order to make the implications of our position as clear as possible, we may develop this argument at greater length.

We may show, first, that there cannot possibly be an alternative other than the three typically represented by Bultmann, Barth, and Buri. To do this, it is sufficient to point out that if the principle in terms of which alternatives are to be conceived is such as to exclude more than two, then the question of a ``third'' possibility is a meaningless question. Thus, if what is at issue is whether ``All S is P,'' it is indifferent whether ``Some S is not P'' or ``No S is P,'' since in either case the judgment in question is false. Hence, if what is in question is whether in a given theology myth is or is not completely rejected, it is unimportant whether only a little bit of myth or a considerable quantity is accepted; for, in either event, the first possibility is excluded. Therefore, the only conceivable alternatives are those represented, on the one hand, by the two at least apparently self-consistent but mutually exclusive positions of Buri and Barth and, on the other hand, by the third but really pseudo position (analogous to a round square) of Bultmann.

A second point requires more extended comment. It will be recalled from the discussion in Section 7 that the position of the ``right,'' as represented by Barth, rests on the following thesis: The only tenable alternative to Bultmann's position is a theology that (1) rejects or at least qualifies his unconditioned demand for demythologization and existential interpretation; (2) accepts instead a special biblical hermeneutics or method of interpretation; and (3) in so doing, frees itself to give appropriate emphasis to the event Jesus Christ by means of statements that, from Bultmann's point of view, are mythological.