The argument was typically advanced in terms of U. S. ``prestige.'' Prestige, however, is only a minor part of the problem; and even then, it is a concept that can be highly misleading. Prestige is a measure of how other people think of you, well or ill. But contrary to what was implied during the campaign, prestige is surely not important for its own sake. Only the vain and incurably sentimental among us will lose sleep simply because foreign peoples are not as impressed by our strength as they ought to be. The thing to lose sleep over is what people, having concluded that we are weaker than we are, are likely to do about it.

The evidence suggests that foreign peoples believe the United States is weaker than the Soviet Union, and is bound to fall still further behind in the years ahead. This ignorant estimate, I repeat, is not of any interest in itself; but it becomes very important if foreign peoples react the way human beings typically do -- namely, by taking steps to end up on what appears to be the winning side. To the extent, then, that declining U. S. prestige means that other nations will be tempted to place their bets on an ultimate American defeat, and will thus be more vulnerable to Soviet intimidation, there is reason for concern.

Still, these guesses about the outcome of the struggle cannot be as important as the actual power relationship between the Soviet Union and ourselves. Here I do not speak of military power where our advantage is obvious and overwhelming but of political power -- of influence, if you will -- about which the relevant questions are: Is Soviet influence throughout the world greater or less than it was ten years ago? And is Western influence greater or less than it used to be?