A former du Pont official became a General Motors vice president and set about maximizing du Pont's share of the General Motors market. Lines of communications were established between the two companies and several du Pont products were actively promoted. Within a few years various du Pont manufactured items were filling the entire requirements of from four to seven of General Motors' eight operating divisions. The Fisher Body division, long controlled by the Fisher brothers under a voting trust even though General Motors owned a majority of its stock, followed an independent course for many years, but by 1947 and 1948 ``resistance had collapsed'' and its purchases from du Pont ``compared favorably'' with purchases by other General Motors divisions. Competitors came to receive higher percentage of General Motors business in later years, but it is ``likely'' that this trend stemmed ``at least in part'' from the needs of General Motors outstripping du Pont's capacity. ``The fact that sticks out in this voluminous record is that the bulk of du Pont's production has always supplied the largest part of the requirements of the one customer in the automobile industry connected to du Pont by a stock interest. The inference is overwhelming that du Pont's commanding position was promoted by its stock interest and was not gained solely on competitive merit.'' 353 U. S., at 605.

This Court agreed with the trial court ``that considerations of price, quality and service were not overlooked by either du Pont or General Motors.'' 353 U. S., at 606. However, it determined that neither this factor, nor ``the fact that all concerned in high executive posts in both companies acted honorably and fairly, each in the honest conviction that his actions were in the best interests of his own company and without any design to overreach anyone, including du Pont's competitors,'' 353 U. S., at 607, outweighed the Government's claim for relief. This claim, as submitted to the District Court and dismissed by it, 126 F. Supp.235, alleged violation not only of 7 of the Clayton Act, but also of 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act. The latter provisions proscribe any contract, combination, or conspiracy in restraint of interstate or foreign trade, and monopolization of, or attempts, combinations, or conspiracies to monopolize, such trade. However, this Court put to one side without consideration the Government's appeal from the dismissal of its Sherman Act allegations. It rested its decision solely on 7, which reads in pertinent part: ``[N] o corporation engaged in commerce shall acquire, directly or indirectly, the whole or any part of the stock or other share capital of another corporation engaged also in commerce, where the effect of such acquisition may be to substantially lessen competition between the corporation whose stock is so acquired and the corporation making the acquisition, or to restrain such commerce in any section or community, or tend to create a monopoly of any line of commerce.