Our major problem is what an enemy might accomplish in an initial attack on a target. This, of course, does not eliminate from consideration for this purpose agents that are associated naturally with epidemic disease. A hypothetical example will illustrate this point. Let us assume that it would be possible for an enemy to create an aerosol of the causative agent of epidemic typhus (Rickettsia prowazwki) over City A and that a large number of cases of typhus fever resulted therefrom. No epidemic was initiated nor was one expected because the population in City A was not lousy. Lousiness is a prerequisite for epidemic typhus. In this case, then, the military objective was accomplished with an epidemic agent solely through the results secured in the initial attack. This was done with full knowledge that there would be no epidemic. On the other hand, a similar attack might have been made on City B whose population was known to be lousy. One might expect some spread of the disease in this case resulting in increased effectiveness of the attack.

The major defensive problems are concerned with the possibility of overt military delivery of biological agents from appropriate disseminating devices. It should be no more difficult to deliver such devices than other weapons. The same delivery vehicles -- whether they be airplanes, submarines or guided missiles -- should be usable. If it is possible for an enemy to put an atomic bomb on a city, it should be equally possible to put a cloud of biological agent over that city.