Hidden behind Hegelian abstractions were more practical reasons for a changing jurisprudence. Related to, but distinguishable from, nationalism was the growth of democracy in one form or another. Increased participation in politics and the demands of various groups for status and recognition had dramatic effects upon law institutions. The efforts of various interest groups to control or influence governmental decisions, particularly when taken in conjunction with the impact of industrialization, led to a concentration of attention on the legislative power and the means whereby policy could be formulated and enforced as law through bureaucratic institutions. Law became a conscious process, something more than simply doing justice and looking to local customs and a common morality for applicable norms. Particularly was this true when the norms previously applied were no longer satisfactory to many, when customs were rapidly changing as the forces of the new productivity were harnessed. The old way of doing things, which depended on a relatively stable community with stable ideas dealing with familiar situations, was no longer adequate to the task. First was the period of codification of existing law: the Code Napoleon in France and the peculiar codification that, in fact, resulted from Austin's restatement and ordering of the Common Law in England. Codification was followed in all countries by a growing amount of legislation, some changing and adjusting the older law, much dealing with entirely new situations. The legislative mills have been grinding ever since, and when its cumbersome processes were no longer adequate to the task, a limited legislative authority was delegated in one form or another, to the executive. Whereas the eighteenth century had been a time in which man sought justice, the nineteenth and twentieth have been centuries in which men are satisfied with law. Indeed, with developed positivism, the separation of law from justice, or from morality generally, became quite specific.